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INTRODUCTION
Can the Alabama Governor’s general constitutional authority to ensure the
laws are “faithfully executed” supersede an express grant of quasi-legislative
authority to another constitutional officer within the very same document? This
was the question left unanswered by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Tyson v.
Jones.1 The court sidestepped the power vested in the Sheriff of Macon County
to promulgate rules and regulations for the operation of bingo and, instead,
deferred to the general constitutional authority of the Governor.2 Yet, this is
only one of the Supreme Court of Alabama’s decisions in a string of ambiguous
opinions on the elusive topic of electronic bingo.3
As a result of the confusion generated by these opinions, a war erupted
between former Alabama Attorney General Troy King, former Governor Bob
Riley, and the owners of Alabama’s electronic bingo halls.4 It seemed as if the
“Bingo War” was over in 2011, when Governor Robert Bentley and Attorney
General Luther Strange took office.5 Despite the hopes of voters, results of the
election did not end the Bingo War; it simply shifted the positions of the play-
ers.6 Attorney General Strange, via authority granted by the Governor, contin-
* Associate, Gilpin Givhan, P.C., Birmingham, Alabama; Member, Alabama Bar.
1 60 So. 3d 831 (Ala. 2010).
2 Id. at 849.
3 See, e.g., Surles v. City of Ashville, 68 So. 3d 89 (Ala. 2011); Chorba-Lee Scholarship
Fund Inc. v. Hale, 60 So. 3d 279 (Ala. 2010); Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach Inc., 42
So. 3d 65 (Ala. 2009); Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park v. Knowles, 39 So. 3d 100 (Ala. 2009).
4 Charles J Dean, In 2010 Bingo Wars Rage Across Alabama, AL.COM, (last updated Sept.
12, 2010, 8:43 AM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/09/in_2010_bingo_wars_rage_across.
html; see also Josh Moon, Gambling in Alabama: A High-Stakes Game of Political Intrigue,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/local/ala
bama/2014/11/08/gambling-in-alabama-has-history-of-political-intrigue-legal-fighting/1698
9033/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
5 See John Shryock, Task Force on Illegal Gambling Set to Change Hands, KPLC (last
updated Dec. 29, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://www.kplctv.com/story/13756574/bentley-to-turn-
task-force-over-to-ags-office.
6 Id.; see also Mike Hollis, Editorial, Bingo, Give Alabama Voters Their Say, AL.COM (last
updated Mar. 29, 2011, 8:11 AM), http://blog.al.com/times-views/2011/03/editorial_bingo_
give_alabama_v.html.
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ues to fight the “Bingo War” against the Sheriffs of Macon and Greene
Counties and the owners of the electronic bingo halls.7
The major contention in this war has also shifted. In the beginning, the
war revolved around the interpretation of “the game commonly known as
bingo,” which the Supreme Court of Alabama later defined in Barber v. Cor-
nerstone Community Outreach Inc.8 However, new battle lines have been
drawn since the Cornerstone decision: Attorney General Strange asserts that he
has the right to interpret the court’s ruling in Cornerstone as an extension of the
Governor’s “supreme executive power”9 to enforce the laws of Alabama.10
This article argues, however, that Attorney General Strange is mistaken. In this
instance, the authority to regulate is the authority to define,11 and the quasi-
legislative authority to define “bingo” beyond the Cornerstone decision has
been expressly vested within the Sheriffs of Greene and Macon Counties.12
This article analyzes constitutional Amendment Nos. 743 and 744, which
grant the Sheriffs of Greene and Macon Counties the authority to “promulgate
rules and regulations” for the operation of bingo games within their respective
jurisdictions. Specifically, this article uses principles of constitutional construc-
tion to analyze the division of authority between the Governor and the Sheriffs
to determine who has the authority to define bingo within those counties. Part I
of this article discusses the legality of bingo in general and the Supreme Court
of Alabama’s definition of the “game commonly or traditionally known as
bingo.”13 Part II discusses the Governor’s power pursuant to his duty to
“ensure the laws are faithfully executed” and the current stance of Alabama on
electronic bingo. Part III uses constitutional construction principles to deter-
mine whether the Governor or the local Sheriff has the authority to define what
qualifies as bingo pursuant to the Cornerstone case.
I. THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA’S ELECTRONIC BINGO ANALYSIS
A. Is Bingo a Lottery?
The Alabama Constitution expressly prohibits lotteries within the state.14
The Supreme Court of Alabama has defined a lottery as having three elements,
7 See Stephanie Taylor, Greene County Sheriff Allows Bingo Parlors to Reopen; Attorney
General Has No Comment on Latest Step, TUSCALOOSA NEWS.COM (Apr. 17, 2014 11:32
PM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/2014 0417/news/140419702; Kim Chandler,
Attorney General’s Office Shuts Down VictoryLand, AL.COM, (Feb. 19, 2013, 9:02 PM),
http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/02/attorney_generals_office_shuts.html; Phillip Rawls, Sheriff
says Ala. Casino Games Legal, TUSCALOOSANEWS.COM (Dec. 13, 2012 3:30 AM), http://
www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20121213/NEWS/121219921.
8 42 So. 3d at 86.
9 ALA. CONST. art V, § 113 (“The supreme executive power of this state shall be vested in a
chief magistrate, who shall be styled ‘The Governor of the State of Alabama.’”).
10 See Shryock, supra note 5.
11 See Joseph L. Lester, How to Legally Gamble in the Bible Belt, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 491,
506–07 (2011).
12 ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
13 See Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86.
14 ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 65.
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“a prize, awarded by chance, and for consideration.”15 Although the Alabama
Constitution does not mention the word “gambling,” the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama has recognized that bingo is gambling and that the words “gambling” and
“lottery” have the same meaning.16
Still, the Alabama Constitution allows individual counties, subject to leg-
islative approval and/or statewide election, to pursue amendments that apply
only to that county.17 Through this process, seventeen jurisdictions have rati-
fied amendments allowing for “charitable bingo,” which are bingo games oper-
ated by nonprofit organizations, thereby excepting them from the prohibition
against lotteries.18 Many of these jurisdictions have attempted to move beyond
the traditional form of bingo into the more lucrative electronic bingo.19 For
most, the language of the amendment did not delegate the express authority to
define the type of bingo to be played, and, as a result, the ratified amendment
would not likely allow electronic bingo.20
Unlike other Amendments permitting charitable bingo, Amendment 744
and 743 expressly state, “[t]he sheriff shall promulgate rules and regulations for
the licensing and operation of bingo games within the county.”21 Amendment
743, by its express language, defines bingo as “that specific kind of game com-
monly known as bingo, in which prizes are awarded on the basis of designated
numbers of symbols on a card or electronic marking machine conforming to
numbers or symbols selected at random.”22 The Amendment then goes on to
define the type of equipment to be used as also including “electronic card
marking machines.”23 Therefore, at least in Greene County—the subject county
of Amendment 743—electronic bingo is expressly allowed. It would also seem,
based on the plain language of the Amendments, that in both Amendment 744
and 743, the Sheriffs of Macon and Greene Counties have vested constitutional
authority to regulate bingo within the county and, therefore, define the type of
bingo allowed within the confines of existing law.
15 Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 534 So. 2d 295, 296 (Ala. 1988).
16 See Houston County Econ. Dev. Auth. v. State, 2014 Ala. LEXIS 183, at *37 (Ala. Nov.
21, 2014) (“[A] lottery prohibited under section 65 of the Constitution [is], consequently,
punishable under Alabama’s generally applicable antigambling laws.”)
17 ALA. CONST. amend. 425.
18 See ALA. CONST. amends. 386, 387, 413, 440, 506, 508, 542, 549, 550, 565, 569, 599,
612, 692, 732, 743, 744.
19 See, e.g., Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass’n, 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006); Barber v.
Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach Inc., 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala. 2009).
20 Compare ALA. CONST. amend. 744 (where the word “electronic” is not present), with
ALA. CONST. amend. 743 (defining bingo as game “in which prizes are awarded on the basis
of designated numbers and symbols on a card or electronic marking machine”) (emphasis
added).
21 Compare ALA. CONST. amend. 550 (stating that rules and regulations for bingo games are
promulgated by the “governing body”), with ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
22 ALA. CONST. amend. 743 (emphasis added).
23 Id.
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B. The Supreme Court of Alabama’s Definition of the “Game Commonly
Known as Bingo”
Opponents of electronic bingo claim that electronic bingo machines are
illegal because they are illegal slot machines.24 The first Supreme Court of
Alabama decision on this issue came in Barber v. Jefferson County Racing
Ass’n, in which the Sheriff of Jefferson County seized all machines playing the
game “Quincy’s MegaSweeps” as “illegal slot machines.”25 The Supreme
Court of Alabama held that the machines were in fact illegal slot machines,
even though the owners had ensured the statutory elements of a “gambling
device” were “missing.”26 Still, the court reasoned that the machines were
“readily adaptable or convertible to such use,” because they could be “re-
tooled” to work as slot machines.27 The court concluded by stating, “Innovative
created a system composed of what were formerly slot machines, which look
like, sound like, and attract the same class of customers as conventional slot
machines . . . . Having ‘taken the risk that’ their venture ‘may cross the line,’ it
is not ‘unfair to require’ that the owners bear the consequences.”28 The court’s
holding in Jefferson County Racing Ass’n effectively shifted the focus from
that of illegal gambling to the machines used to gamble, so that a person is
effectively gambling whenever the machines look like slot machines.29
The Supreme Court of Alabama then took the next step in Barber v. Cor-
nerstone Community Outreach, Inc., when it defined “the game commonly
known as bingo.”30 In Cornerstone, Governor Riley’s Task Force on Illegal
Gambling raided the Cornerstone Community Outreach bingo hall in the Town
of White Hall and seized “approximately 105 electronic gaming machines.”31
The Task Force argued that Amendment 674, which allowed bingo in the Town
of White Hall, should be “narrowly construed” because it is an exception to
Alabama’s general prohibition against lotteries.32 On the other hand, Corner-
stone argued that the “plain meaning” of Amendment 674 did not create an
exception to the prohibition against lotteries.33
To resolve the question, the Supreme Court of Alabama created a six-part
test.34 The court crafted this six-part test by looking to section 45–8–150(1) of
24 Jason Wright & Skylar Zwick, The Battle Over Bingo Series Parts 1 Through 4, WTVY,
http://www.wtvy.com/home/headlines/83844907.html (last updated Jan. 26, 2011); see also
ALA. CODE § 13A-12-20(10) (2014) (defining the term “slot machine”).
25 960 So. 2d 599, 601–02 (Ala. 2006).
26 Id. at 614.
27 Id. at 610 (“[T]he statutory definition of a slot machine includes any device that is ‘con-
structed or readily adaptable or convertible to such use’ . . . . [The MegaSweeps machines]
could be retooled to operate as [slot machines].”).
28 Id. at 616.
29 Id.
30 42 So. 3d 65, 86 (Ala. 2009) (setting forth a list of six characteristics that define the
“game commonly or traditionally known as bingo”).
31 Id. at 68.
32 Id. at 78.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 86. (“The characteristics of [bingo] include the following: 1. Each Player uses one
or more cards with spaces arranged in five columns and rows, with an alphanumeric or
similar designation assigned to each space. 2. Alphanumeric or similar designations are ran-
domly drawn and announced one by one. 3. In order to play, each player must pay attention
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the 1975 Alabama Code, wherein the legislature had defined “bingo” for pur-
poses of Amendment 508, “which legalized ‘bingo games’ in Calhoun
County.”35 After articulating the test, the court then applied it to Amendment
674 and held that the bingo machines at issue were illegal because they “oper-
ate almost exactly like slot machines.”36 The court pointed to the following
factors in coming to its conclusion: the game was over in six seconds without
any “player interaction” or “numbered cards,” the losing players were not
informed of who won the “bingo game,” and no evidence was proffered that a
server linking the machines together meant players were actually playing
against one another.37
The court, however, did not explicitly state that all electronic bingo
machines were illegal. In fact, the court made clear that its holding was limited
to Amendment 674 as written, contrasting Amendment 743, which allows
bingo in Greene County.38 The court differentiated the Greene County amend-
ment, because it expressly defines the form of bingo and equipment to include
an “electronic marking machine in lieu of a paper card.”39 Seemingly, the court
would allow electronic bingo, so long as the amendment expressly allows for
electronic machines, and uses equipment that “contemplates a game in all mate-
rial respects similar to the game of bingo described in [section] 45-8-150(1),”
as defined by the six-part test in Cornerstone.40
Finally, in Macon County Greyhound Park v. Knowles, the Supreme Court
of Alabama interpreted a contract between VictoryLand, a bingo hall in Macon
County, and one of its patrons.41 In Knowles, the court was asked to determine
which contract governed: the Sheriff’s regulations or the “rules of the wager.”42
After holding that the rules of the wager governed the transaction between Vic-
toryLand and the player, the court expressly declined to rule on the legality of
electronic bingo.43 In order to rule on the legality of the gambling contract in
question, however, the court had to implicitly find the electronic bingo
machines in question legal; otherwise, the contract at issue would have been
to the values announced; if one of the values matches a value on one or more of the player’s
cards, the player must physically act by marking his or her card accordingly. 4. A player can
fail to pay proper attention or to properly mark his or her card, and thereby miss an opportu-
nity to be declared a winner. 5. A player must recognize that his or her card has a “bingo,”
i.e., a predetermined pattern of matching values, and in turn announce to the other players
and the announcer that this is the case before any other player does so. 6. The game of bingo
contemplates a group activity in which multiple players compete against each other to be the
first to properly mark a card with the predetermined winning pattern and announce that
fact.”).
35 Id. at 79.
36 Id. at 86–87.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 79–80.
39 Id. at 80.
40 Id. at 80, 86.
41 39 So. 3d 100, 106 (Ala. 2009).
42 Id. at 106–07.
43 Id. at 107 n.1 (“We express no opinion as to whether Amendment No. 744, actually does
authorize the type of activity here involved. That issue is not presented in this case.”).
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based upon an illegal gambling contract.44 The case would have been dismissed
for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an objection that the court will bring
sua sponte when the parties fail to do so.45 Yet, the Macon County amendment,
unlike the Greene County amendment, does not expressly allow electronic
bingo.46 Consequently, the court had to uphold the legality of the amendment
on other grounds. This author believes that these grounds could have been
upheld as the Sheriff’s constitutional authority to define bingo through “rules
and regulations,” including the type of bingo to be played.
There is no definitive answer on the legality of electronic bingo in Ala-
bama. The Supreme Court of Alabama has remained silent on this point,
instead finding no justiciable issue to be resolved or resolving the bingo-related
cases on other grounds.47 However, despite the confusion, it seems the
Supreme Court of Alabama may allow electronic bingo in certain counties so
long as the machines meet the six-part test in Cornerstone and the county
amendment vests the local official with the authority to define the type of bingo
to be played.48
II. THE GOVERNOR’S WAR ON ELECTRONIC BINGO IN ALABAMA
A. The Governor’s Stance on Bingo
In the beginning of the Bingo Wars, former Alabama Governor Bob Riley
stood as the biggest obstacle to electronic bingo in Alabama.49 In his view,
paper bingo is the only type of bingo allowed in the state.50 Former Attorney
General Troy King took the opposite approach following an extensive review
of all bingo halls in the state.51 As a result, a major political battle developed
between Governor Riley and Attorney General King.52 Attorney General King
believed that electronic bingo machines could be legal so long as they met his
proposed definition of bingo—a definition remarkably similar to the one
announced later in Cornerstone.53 In response to these findings, Governor
44 Id. at 107 (stating that the validity of the enforceability of the contract was stipulated to
by the parties, and therefore, not considered by the court).
45 See Surles v. City of Ashville, 68 So. 3d 89, 92 (Ala. 2011) (“This Court must sua sponte
recognize and address the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction owing to the lack of
justiciability.”).
46 Compare ALA. CONST. amend. 744 (Macon County), with ALA. CONST. amend. 743
(Greene County).
47 See Surles, 68 So. 3d at 89; Tyson v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, 43 So. 3d 587,
591–92 (Ala. 2010); see also Tyson v. Jones, 60 So. 3d 831 (Ala. 2010) (deciding the case
on separation of powers grounds).
48 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
49 See Phillip Rawls, Alabama Gov. Bob Riley is Cracking Down on Bingo Parlors, DESE-
RET NEWS (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700014153/Alabama-Gov-
Bob-Riley-is-cracking-down-on-bingo-parlors.html?pg=all.
50 Id.
51 J. Mark White et al., Bingo in Alabama: More than Just a Game, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 509,
512 (2011) (“In December 2004, then-Attorney General Troy King announced the results of
his ‘unprecedented, hands-on evaluation and review of gambling occurring in Alabama’ . . . .
The first shot of what would become the Bingo Wars had been fired.”).
52 Moon, supra note 4.
53 See White et al., supra note 51, at 512.
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Riley created the Governor’s Task Force on Illegal Gambling through Execu-
tive Order 44.54 Governor Riley explained that the Task Force was a necessary
step in light of Attorney General King’s failure to enforce the gaming laws of
the state.55
Under the Alabama Constitution, any lottery or scheme in the form of a
lottery is prohibited.56 The Supreme Court of Alabama in City of Piedmont v.
Evans determined that the game of bingo was an illegal lottery under Alabama
law, except where allowed through constitutional amendment.57 In later cases,
Alabama courts explained that the Piedmont decision stood for the proposition
that bingo amendments are “narrow exceptions” to Alabama’s prohibition
against lotteries and, therefore, can only include “the ordinary game of
bingo.”58
Moreover, gambling and the possession of slot machines is a crime under
Alabama law.59 The court previously stated in dicta that any machines “which
look like” and “serve essentially the same function as . . . slot machines” could
be considered an illegal slot machine.60 Governor Riley further argued that
although the constitutional amendments give local sheriffs the authority to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations, these amendments only permit regulation of the
hours of use and licensure, and do not vest the sheriffs with the authority to
change the definition of bingo.61 Therefore, Governor Riley concluded that the
“ordinary game of bingo” means only paper bingo and, therefore, any elec-
tronic bingo machine in the State of Alabama is an illegal slot machine.62
Even following the Cornerstone decision, Governor Riley maintained that
electronic bingo had been outlawed because it could not fit within “the game
commonly known as bingo.”63 However, Governor Riley overlooked several
important facts. First, the court in Cornerstone never expressly stated that elec-
tronic bingo could not fit within its ruling; in fact, the court went to great
lengths to make no determination on that issue.64 Second, the case Governor
Riley relied on interprets a bingo amendment with substantially different lan-
guage from the Greene and Macon County Amendments.65 Finally, under the
54 Id. at 515
55 Ala. Exec. Order No. 44 (Dec. 30 2008), available at http://www.archives.alabama.gov/
executiveorders/executiveorders/2008_44.pdf (stating that the Task Force was created “for
the purpose of promoting and supporting uniform statewide enforcement of Alabama’s anti-
gambling laws”).
56 ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 65.
57 642 So. 2d 435, 436–37 (Ala. 1994).
58 E.g., Foster v. State, 705 So. 2d 534, 537–38 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Barrett v. State,
705 So. 2d 529, 532 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (“[T]he City of Piedmont could not pass an
ordinance that broadens the scope of the narrow exception to the prohibition of lotteries.”).
59 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-20 to -31 (2014) (setting forth general provisions of “gambling
offenses”).
60 Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass’n, 960 So. 2d 599, 616 (Ala. 2006).
61 Lester, supra note 11, at 500.
62 Ala. Exec. Order No. 44, supra note 55.
63 See Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, 42 So. 3d 65, 80 (Ala. 2009).
64 Id. (“[T]he Riley defendants do not contend that a ‘bingo game’ must be played only on
paper cards, and we, therefore, do not address that issue.”).
65 Compare City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435, 436 (Ala. 1994) (interpreting
Amendment 508), with ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
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plain language of Amendments 744 and 743, the Sheriff’s ability to regulate
extends much farther than the hours of operation.66
In the wake of the political chaos created by the Bingo War, the suc-
ceeding Alabama Governor, Robert Bentley, dissolved the Governor’s Task
Force on Illegal Gambling.67 Governor Bentley believed that the gambling
Task Force was no longer necessary because current Attorney General Strange
would effectively enforce the gambling laws of the state.68 After taking over
the work of the Task Force, Attorney General Strange released a statement
reiterating that “electronic bingo” was illegal under state law.69 He has since
enforced his policy by raiding any electronic bingo hall in Alabama, including
Macon County’s VictoryLand and the Porch Creek Indians Wind Creek
Casino.70
B. The Governor’s “Authority” After Tyson v. Jones71
Pursuant to his authority as head of Governor Riley’s task force, John M.
Tyson Jr. attempted to raid every non-Indian electronic bingo hall in Alabama
in early 2010, effectively moving the Bingo War once again back into the
courtroom.72 Following one of these raids, the Macon County Sheriff, District
Attorney, and County Commission brought an action against Tyson as head of
the Governor’s Task Force enjoining him from raiding the casino.73 The
“Macon County Plaintiffs” claimed that the Task Force had “usurp[ed] the
authority” of the Macon County District Attorney as well as the Macon County
Sheriff by raiding VictoryLand.74 On behalf of Governor Riley, Tyson argued
that the Governor’s constitutional authority to “take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed” gave him the authority to investigate illegal gambling in the
state.75 Pursuant to this authority, the Governor could direct law enforcement
officers to investigate perceived illegal gambling based upon Governor Riley’s
determination that the gambling laws were not being enforced in Macon
County.76 The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the Constitution “plainly
vest[s] the governor with an authority to act on behalf of the state and to ensure
66 See infra Part III.C.
67 Ala. Exec. Order No. 1 (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://governor.alabama.gov/news
room/2011/01/executive-order-number-1/.
68 Id. (“[T]he new Attorney General, Luther Strange, has stated that he intends to enforce
the laws of the State of Alabama with respect to anti-gambling, lottery schemes and illegal
gambling.”).
69 News Release, Luther Strange, AG Strange Warns That So-Called Electronic Bingo
Machines Still Illegal Under State Law (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.ago.state.al.us/news/
182.pdf; see also Shryock, supra note 5.
70 Victoryland Closed Again with Troopers Serving Warrants, Making Seizures, AL.COM
(last updated Feb. 19, 2013, 9:51 AM), http://blog.al.com/montgomery/2013/02/victoryland_
closed_again_with.html.
71 60 So. 3d 831 (Ala. 2010).
72 See Ashlee Hightower, Comment, B-I-N-G-O - Not Your Grandmother’s Church Hall
Social: A Look at the Evolution of Bingo and Why Alabama Should Get in on the Game, 41
CUMB. L. REV. 79, 107 (2011).
73 Tyson, 60 So. 3d at 837.
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 845.
76 Id.
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‘that all laws are faithfully executed,’” and this grant of authority trumps the
local Sheriff’s authority when he is acting as an executive branch official.77
In order to resolve the question in Tyson, the Supreme Court of Alabama
analyzed the Governor’s constitutional authority as “the head of the executive
department of the state.”78 Under the Alabama Constitution, the executive
department consists of the “governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general . . .
and a sheriff for each county.”79 However, the “supreme executive power of
this state” is vested in the Governor,80 who “shall take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.”81 Furthermore, the court stated that the Governor’s duty is
“‘supreme’ to the ‘duties’ given the other executive-branch officials.”82 Conse-
quently, the court determined that Tyson’s actions on behalf of Governor
Riley’s Task Force were within the Governor’s constitutional authority to
ensure the “laws are faithfully executed.”83 The court reasoned that the final
decision to enforce or not enforce a law is vested in the Governor as the head of
the executive department of the state.84 According to the court, this authority is
superior to the authority granted to other executive officers, such as the Sheriff
and District Attorney of Macon County.85 Therefore, the court found that the
Governor’s determination that Alabama criminal laws “had gone unenforced”
in Macon County was superior to the executive authority of local officials.86
Accordingly, after Tyson v. Jones, the Governor had the power to deter-
mine that any form of electronic bingo is illegal gambling, and, therefore, the
local Sheriff’s inaction in stopping it constitutes grounds for the Governor to
dispatch the Task Force to ensure the laws are enforced.87 This, in turn, effec-
tively gives the Governor the authority to act as interpreter of the Cornerstone
decision and determine the type of bingo allowed under each of the constitu-
tional amendments. The court in Tyson only looked at the executive powers of
the Sheriff and District Attorney.88 In doing so, the court looked only at the
statutes defining the Sheriff’s general executive authority and ignored Alabama
Constitutional Amendment 744, which granting the Macon County Sheriff the
authority to “promulgate rules and regulations” for the licensing and operation
77 Id. at 846 (citing Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 57 So. 3d 704, 719 (Ala.
2010) (emphasis omitted)).
78 Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. V, § 113).
79 ALA. CONST. art. V, § 112.
80 ALA. CONST. art. V, § 113.
81 ALA. CONST. art. V, § 120.
82 Tyson, 60 So. 3d at 846 (analyzing ALA. CONST. art. V, § 113—terming the Governor as
“a chief magistrate”—by citing the definition of “magistrate” from BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY 970 (8th ed. 2004)).
83 Id. at 849–51.
84 Id. at 847 (“[T]he power to enforce the laws is not left as a matter of finality to the
discretion of the local authorities or the local inhabitants; but power was placed in the head
of the executive department . . . for the whole state.”).
85 Id. at 849–51; see also Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 57 So. 3d 704, 722
(Ala. 2010) (“[W]hen the governor determines that, whether due to inaction or inadequate
action by the other official, it is necessary for him to act lest the law go unenforced, he may
act.”).
86 Tyson, 60 So. 3d at 849.
87 Id. at 845.
88 See generally id.
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of bingo.89 As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama did not squarely answer
the real question posed in Tyson: is the Governor’s general executive authority
to “take care the laws are faithfully executed” superior to the Macon County
Sheriff’s specific, express, quasi-legislative authority to regulate bingo within
Macon County? This author would answer “no.” The Macon County Sheriff
has been vested with quasi-legislative authority to define bingo within Macon
County, and this specific grant of authority preempts the Governor from mak-
ing the crucial interpretation in Tyson—that the bingo being played in Macon
County was in fact illegal.
III. THE ROAD NOT TRAVELED: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF
ALABAMA’S LATEST BINGO AMENDMENTS
In the wake of each new Supreme Court of Alabama bingo decision, the
law surrounding electronic bingo in Alabama becomes cloudier. In part, this is
due to the political debate that has raged in the background of every decision
surrounding electronic bingo. The majority of this confusion, though, stems
from the Supreme Court of Alabama’s refusal to explicitly rule on the legality
of electronic bingo—a choice likely based on the political fallout that would
follow such a decision. If the court were to rule on the legality of electronic
bingo, the issue will likely revolve around one same question that was at the
heart of Tyson. Under Alabama’s rules of constitutional construction, the scope
of exclusive authority granted to the Sheriffs by the constitutional amendments
legalizing bingo within county limits includes the ability to define and interpret
the type of bingo to be played. Therefore, the power to define what is “bingo”
is stripped from the Governor by the same document granting the Sheriff this
authority. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Alabama has given some indica-
tion that at least two counties could allow electronic bingo because of their
amendments’ express language.90
A. The Greene and Macon County Amendments Could Allow Electronic
Bingo
Of the seventeen jurisdictions in Alabama where charitable bingo is cur-
rently allowed, Greene and Macon County are likely the only two that could
allow electronic bingo.91 The amendments in these two counties stand apart
from the other fifteen because of several key differences in the amendments’
language.92 Both Amendment Nos. 743 and 744 vest the Sheriff—rather than
the “governing body”—with the power to regulate bingo within the county.93
Amendment No. 744, legalizing bingo in Macon County, states that “the
operation of bingo games . . . shall be legal.”94 It further states that “[t]he
sheriff shall promulgate rules and regulations for the licensing and operation of
bingo games within the county [and] shall insure compliance pursuant to any
89 ALA. CONST. amend. 744.
90 See ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
91 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
92 Id.
93 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
94 ALA. CONST. amend. 744.
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rule or regulation.”95 Similarly, the language in Amendment No. 743, allowing
bingo in Greene County, states that: “[b]ingo games for prizes or money may
be operated . . . in Greene County. The sheriff shall promulgate rules and regu-
lations for the licensing, permitting, and operation of bingo games within the
county. The sheriff shall insure compliance with such rules and regulations.”96
In contrast, every other constitutional amendment legalizing bingo games
gives the power to create rules and regulations to the governing body or local
legislature.97 Furthermore, these amendments also contain language limiting
the local authorities grant of power by including “as provided by law regulating
such operation.”98 Therefore, unlike the other fifteen jurisdictions, the express
language of the Macon and Greene County amendments plainly vests the
power to create and enforce rules and regulations relating to bingo solely in the
Sheriff of the county.99
B. The Quasi-Legislative Authority to Regulate Bingo Has Been Delegated
to the Sheriff
Despite the express constitutional authority that these amendments have
vested in the Sheriff, both former Governor Riley and current Attorney General
Luther Strange believe the power to “regulate” bingo does not include the
authority to interpret and define bingo beyond Cornerstone; rather, they believe
the power to regulate only includes determining the hours of operation and who
obtains licenses.100 This interpretation is flawed. Although the Governor has
constitutional authority to enforce the laws under the Alabama Constitution,101
the Supreme Court of Alabama has stated, “sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.”102 The people
of certain jurisdictions in Alabama, furthermore, chose to vest the quasi-legisla-
tive authority to define bingo solely in the County Sheriff within specific geo-
graphic boundaries.103
Moreover, the Legislature may delegate quasi-legislative power to local
officials to make “rules and regulations” within definite limits written into an
amendment.104 Through this delegation, the local official to whom the power
95 Id. (emphasis added).
96 ALA. CONST. amend. 743.
97 E.g., ALA. CONST. amends. 386, 387.
98 E.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 440.
99 ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744; see also Chorba-Lee Scholarship Fund Inc. v. Hale, 60
So. 3d 279, 287 n.4 (Ala. 2010) (stating that Amendment 386 expressly grants the authority
to regulate to the governing body, and highlighting that, in contrast, amendments 743 and
744 grant that express authority to the sheriff).
100 See supra Part II.A.
101 Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 57 So. 3d 704, 733 (Ala. 2010).
102 Black v. Pike Cnty. Comm’n, 360 So. 2d 303, 305 (Ala. 1978).
103 Compare, e.g., ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744, with, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 440
(legalizing bingo in Mobile County subject to “law regulating such operation”).
104 See Cagle v. Qualified Electors of Winston Cnty., 470 So. 2d 1208, 1210–11 (Ala.
1985) (finding the delegation of legislative power to the officials of Winston County through
Amendment 225 was not violative of article IV, section 44 of the Alabama Constitution);
Nelson v. Donaldson, 50 So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala. 1951) (stating a “legislative body may dele-
gate to a subordinate body the power to execute and administer its laws” within reasonable
limits declared by the enactment); Compton v. Ala. Power Co., 114 So. 46, 49 (Ala. 1927)
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was delegated can then say what can and cannot be done within the sphere of
authority expressly granted.105 For example, in Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge No. 64 v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County,106 the legislature created
personnel boards within certain counties and vested within these boards the
authority to “control by rules and regulations and practices . . . all employees
and appointees” holding civil service positions within the county.107 The
Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the grant of quasi-legislative authority and
gave deference to the Personnel Board’s ability “to govern and control the
employees in the civil-service system through rules and regulations it promul-
gates.”108 In comparison, the power delegated to the Sheriffs by Amendments
743 and 744, grants the Sheriffs the authority to determine the type of bingo
allowed in their county, as long as it falls within the confines of existing law.109
Furthermore, when an amendment vests power in one person, that power
cannot be exercised by anyone else.110 For example, in Chorba-Lee Scholar-
ship Fund Inc. v. Hale, a charitable bingo hall in Jefferson County brought an
action seeking to have the Sheriff’s bingo regulations invalidated.111 The
Supreme Court of Alabama struck down the regulations and declared the por-
tion of the statute granting the Sheriff his authority was unconstitutional.112
According to the court, the regulations were invalid because Amendment 386
granted the “governing body of Jefferson County” the exclusive power to regu-
late bingo, and did not give this authority to the Sheriff of Jefferson County.113
The “Bingo Act” granting the Sheriff his regulatory authority was declared
unconstitutional due to the express and conflicting language in Amendment
386.114 Moreover, in a footnote, the court distinguished Amendment 386 from
Amendments 743 and 744, which expressly grant the local Sheriff the authority
to regulate bingo.115 As a result, the court’s holding in Chorba-Lee—that the
Jefferson County governing body has the “exclusive” authority to regulate
bingo in Jefferson County—implies that the Sheriffs of Greene and Macon
Counties have the exclusive authority to regulate bingo in their respective
counties.
Even other Alabama constitutional officers have recognized that the Sher-
iff has this authority. For example, former Attorney General Troy King took
this position following a review of electronic gaming machines in Alabama.116
(citing State v. A.C.L.R. Co., 47 So. 969, 976 (Fla. 1908)); Schultes v. Eberly, 2 So. 345,
346 (Ala. 1887) (finding the legislature has implied constitutional authority to delegate legis-
lative power to local “municipal corporations” for the operation of the law within a locality).
105 Compton, 114 So. at 48–49.
106 103 So. 3d 17 (Ala. 2012).
107 Id. at 30.
108 Id.
109 ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
110 See generally Chorba-Lee Scholarship Fund, Inc. v. Hale, 60 So. 3d 279 (Ala. 2010).
111 Id. at 280.
112 Id. at 288.
113 Id. at 287 (“This attempt by the legislature to extend regulatory authority over bingo to
the sheriff in Jefferson County is in direct conflict with Amendment No. 386, which clearly
vests only the governing body of Jefferson County . . . with [that] exclusive authority.”).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 287 n.4.
116 See White et al., supra note 51, at 511–12.
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Attorney General King found that, under current Alabama law, electronic gam-
ing machines are legal so long as they retain the essential features of the game
of bingo.117 King’s interpretation, even though it preceded the Supreme Court
of Alabama’s ruling in Cornerstone, was substantially similar to that court’s
definition of “the game commonly known as bingo.”118 Furthermore, Judge
Thomas Young of Macon County refused to sign a search warrant for Victory-
Land based on a lack of probable cause to believe the machines were, in fact,
illegal slot machines.119 Judge Young recognized that the machines were legal
under the amendments as long as they comply with the six characteristics of the
Cornerstone ruling120
The people of Greene and Macon Counties vested the Sheriffs of their
counties with the exclusive quasi-legislative authority to regulate bingo within
their county.121 They did so through the clear and express language of a consti-
tutional amendment to the Alabama Constitution—the “supreme law” of the
land.122 As a result, no other constitutional officer can assert the authority
granted to the Sheriffs to make interpretations through rules and regulations.123
C. Canons of Alabama Constitutional Construction
Although in Greene and Macon Counties the exclusive authority to regu-
late bingo has been vested in the Sheriff, the Supreme Court of Alabama’s rules
of constitutional construction provide further support of the scope of the Sher-
iff’s quasi-legislative authority to regulate. In Alabama, the judicial philosophy
of constitutional interpretation is that of judicial restraint, whereby it is the
authors of an amendment “who should judge when a social change is a good
change,” and adopt that change through the enactment of amendments to the
constitution.124 The Supreme Court of Alabama in Cornerstone stated the most
applicable rules of construction with regard to the bingo amendments.125 First,
“bingo amendments are exceptions to the lottery prohibition, and the exception
117 Id. at 512.
118 Compare id. (“(1) a grid of five horizontal and five vertical squares; (2) numbers ran-
domly selected; (3) a preordained winning pattern; (4) spinning wheels and other video
graphics must not affect game play; (5) players on the machines must compete against one
another.”), with Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 86 (Ala. 2009)
(setting forth the six identifying qualities of a bingo game).
119 Jennifer Horton, Ala. AG’s Office Unseals Victoryland Search Warrant Documents,
WSFA (last updated Mar. 2, 2013, 8:21 PM), http://www.wsfa.com/story/21292670/ala-ags-
office-unseals-victoryland-search-warrant.
120 See id. (providing links to the unsealed documents as well as a picture of Judge Young’s
handwritten note at the end of the search warrant, in which he reiterates that he does not
believe probable cause to execute a search exists).
121 See ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
122 Johnson v. Craft, 87 So. 375, 380 (Ala. 1921) (“The Constitution of Alabama . . . is the
supreme law within the realm and sphere of its authority. Subject only to the restraints . . .
from the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Alabama is the highest form
and expression of law that exists in the state.”).
123 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
124 Marc James Ayers, Interpreting the Alabama Constitution, 71 ALA. LAW. 287, 288
(2010) (citing Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 439 (Ala.
2001)).
125 Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 78 (Ala. 2009).
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should be narrowly construed,” or limited to the express language of the
amendment.126 Next, the court will look at the “plain and commonly under-
stood meaning of the terms used” in the amendment to determine its scope of
authority.127 Furthermore, the main goal in constitutional construction is to
“ascertain and effectuate the intention of the people in the adoption of the con-
stitution.”128 To determine this intention, the court will look at the words used
and read those words in the context of the amendments history.129
(1) The Sheriff’s Authority is Mandatory Under the Plain Meaning
Standard
It is a long-settled, fundamental principle of constitutional construction to
refer to the plain meaning of the text.130 In doing so, the court may neither
broaden nor restrict the plain meaning of the words.131 In applying this stan-
dard to Amendment 674132 in Cornerstone, the Supreme Court of Alabama
stated that “we look to the plain and commonly understood meaning of the
terms used” at the time the constitutional provision was written.133 Therefore,
the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the words used in the Macon and Greene
County amendments must be used to analyze the scope of the Sheriff’s author-
ity under the court’s rules of constitutional construction.
Amendments 744 and 743 both expressly state that, “[t]he sheriff shall
promulgate rules and regulations” for the “licensing” and “operation of bingo
games within the county.”134 In determining the scope of this grant of author-
ity, the material words are “shall” and “rules and regulations.” Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “shall” as “ha[ving] a duty to; more broadly, is required to,”
in the “mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically
uphold.”135 The Oxford English Dictionary also defines shall as it is used in
“statutes, regulations, etc.,” as “must according to a command or instruc-
tion.”136 The Supreme Court of Alabama has also held the word “shall” to
mean “mandatory.”137 As a result, the express words, “the sheriff shall promul-
gate rules and regulations,” without any other express limitations, seem to
126 Id.; see also Griggs v. Bennett, 710 So. 2d 411, 413–14 (Ala. 1998) (holding that a
proviso allowing an extra six months for Henry County judges to serve during a vacancy
was an exception to a general constitutional provision, and therefore needed to be strictly
construed, and therefore could not be extended to the entire Twentieth Judicial Circuit
because the express language of the proviso limited its reach to Henry County).
127 Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 79.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.; see also Jefferson Cnty. v. Weissman, 69 So. 3d 827, 834 (Ala. 2011).
131 Weissman, 69 So. 3d at 834.
132 ALA. CONST. amend. 674 (legalizing bingo in The Town of White Hall).
133 Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 79.
134 ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744 (emphasis added).
135 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009).
136 OXFORD U. PRESS, 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL
PRINCIPLES 2808 (Lesley Brown ed., 5th ed. 1993).
137 Padgett v. Conecuh Cnty. Comm’n, 901 So. 2d 678, 686 (Ala. 2004) (referring to shall
as “the mandatory word”); Prince v. Hunter, 388 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1980) (“[T]he word
‘shall’ must be construed as mandatory.”).
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make it mandatory for the Sheriff to make interpretations concerning bingo in
the county.
In Chorba-Lee, the Supreme Court of Alabama interpreted Amendment
386 in this way.138 The Court held that the express language of the Amendment
386139 made it mandatory for the governing body of Jefferson County to pro-
mulgate the rules and regulations.140 However, Amendment 386 in Chorba-Lee
does not grant the same level of authority as do Amendment 743 and 744. In
Chorba-Lee, the words “shall have the authority to promulgate” only grant the
possibility that the governing body of Jefferson County could create rules and
regulations.141 On the other hand, the express language “the sheriff shall pro-
mulgate rules and regulations” grants the sole authority contemplated in the
amendment to the Sheriff and requires that the Sheriff use it.142
The term “rule” ordinarily means an authoritative formal standard used to
guide conduct in a certain situation.143 The term “regulation” similarly means
an authoritative direction or standing order prescribing or “controlling some
matter.”144 Even though the Supreme Court of Alabama has never explicitly
defined “rules and regulations,” the court has given some general guidelines.
The Legislature is allowed to expressly give local officials, within valid limita-
tions, the ability to promulgate rules and regulations “for the complete opera-
tion and enforcement of the law within its expressed general purpose.”145 The
Supreme Court of Alabama has stated, “the act of rate-making and regulation is
a function of, and may be delegated by, the Legislature.”146 For example, in
Shell v. Jefferson County, the court read the plain language of  Amendment 73
of the Alabama Constitution to allow “[t]he governing body of Jefferson
county . . . to manage, operate, control and administer the sewers and plants
herein provided for and, to that end, may make any reasonable and nondiscrim-
inatory rules and regulations fixing rates and charges.”147 The court held that
Amendment 73, through its general grant of authority to promulgate rules and
regulations, allowed Jefferson County to set sewer service rates in the
138 Chorba-Lee Scholarship Fund, Inc. v. Hale, 60 So. 3d 279, 280 (Ala. 2010).
139 ALA. CONST. amend. 386 (“The said governing bodies shall have the authority to pro-
mulgate rules and regulation.”).
140 Chorba-Lee, 60 So. 3d at 287–88.
141 See id. at 287; see also ALA. CONST. amend. 386.
142 ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
143 For more expansive definitions of the word “rule,” see BLACK’S, supra note 135, at 1446
(“[A]n established and authoritative standard or principle; a general norm mandating or guid-
ing conduct or action in a given type of situation.”); OXFORD, supra note 136, at 2646 (“A
formal order or regulation governing the procedure or decisions of a court of law.”).
144 OXFORD, supra note 136, at 2530 (defining the word regulation as “[a] rule prescribed
for controlling some matter, or for the regulating of conduct; an authoritative direction”); see
also BLACK’S, supra note 135, at 1398 (“[R]egulation [is a noun meaning] the act or process
of controlling by rule or restriction.”).
145 Compton v. Ala. Power Co., 114 So. 46, 49 (Ala. 1927); see also Nelson v. Donaldson,
50 So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala. 1951) (stating that a “legislative body may delegate to a
subordinate body the power to execute and administer its laws” within reasonable limits
declared by the enactment).
146 Jefferson Cnty. v. City of Leeds, 675 So. 2d 353, 355 (Ala. 1995).
147 454 So. 2d 1331, 1334–35 (Ala. 1984).
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county.148 The court also held that Jefferson County’s authority could not be
superseded by another branch, in this case the legislative branch, without an
amendment to the constitution.149
Similarly, the general purpose of each of the Greene and Macon County
amendments is the operation of bingo within their jurisdictions.150 Moreover,
the amendments limit the authority of the Sheriff to promulgate rules and regu-
lations only for the “licensing, permitting, and operation of bingo games within
the county.”151 The Sheriff must also abide by specific parameters stated within
the amendment.152 Therefore, by expressly stating the “the sheriff shall pro-
mulgate rules and regulations,” the amendments give the Sheriff the mandatory
power to regulate the complete operation of bingo facilities within his jurisdic-
tion, within the specific limitations stated within the amendment.153 As a result,
the Sheriff would have the authority to determine the types of bingo allowed in
the county, as long as his interpretations comply with existing law.
(2) The Original Intent Was to Give the Sheriff the Authority
The leading purpose of constitutional construction is to give effect to the
original “intent and object originally intended to be accomplished.”154 To
determine this intention, the Court will look at the words used, and read those
words in the context of the amendment’s history.155 The Alabama House of
Representatives amended the first version of Amendment 743, passed by the
citizens of Greene County and sent to the Alabama House of Representatives
for confirmation, to exclude “electronic marking machines” from the equip-
ment clause.156 The Alabama House, however, later added back the phrase
“electronic card marking machines” to the equipment clause in its proposed
substitute of the amendment with language directing the Sheriff to determine
by regulation the hours and days of operation.157 As a result, the legislative
intent of Amendment 743 indicates that the Alabama House of Representatives
148 Id. at 1337 (“Amendment 73 clearly authorizes the County to set rates for sewer
service.”).
149 Id.
150 ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
151 ALA. CONST. amend. 743; see also ALA. CONST. amend. 744 (the only textual difference
between the relevant sentences in Amendment 743 and 744 is that Amendment 744 omits the
word “permitting.”).
152 ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744 (requiring that, in addition to any rules or regulations
that the Sheriff may promulgate, all bingo games must adhere to certain rules, including: (1)
excluding persons under 19 years of age; (2) being operated by nonprofit organizations; (3)
placing caps on how much prize money, or monetary equivalent, can be won at each
session).
153 See id.
154 Alexander v. State ex rel. Carver, 150 So. 2d 204, 208 (Ala. 1963); see also Barber v.
Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 79 (Ala. 2009) (stating that interpreting a
constitutional provision’s original meaning means looking to the original intent, history,
existing order of things, and the state of the law at the time (citing Houston Cnty. v. Martin,
169 So. 13, 16 (Ala. 1936))).
155 Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 79 (quoting State v. Sayre, 24 So. 89, 92 (Ala. 1897)).
156 H.R. SB9, 2nd Spec. Sess., at 1 (Ala. 2003).
157 Id.
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contemplated the issue of electronic bingo and intentionally allowed it.158 The
inclusion of language expressly mandating the Sheriff to determine hours and
days of operation indicates that, contrary to the interpretation proposed by Gov-
ernor Riley, the regulatory authority granted to the Sheriff could not be limited
to these subjects.159 The Alabama Senate’s lack of objection to the amendment
indicates that they also intended to allow the Sheriff to have an expansive
authority.160 Amendment 744, legalizing bingo in Macon County, has similar
legislative history.161 The intent of the citizens of Greene and Macon Counties,
in passing the constitutional amendments, was to give the Sheriff the power not
only to regulate, but also to define and interpret.162
(3) General Tools of Constitutional Construction
In addition to the most relevant cannons of constitutional construction set
forth by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Cornerstone,163 other general rules
of constitutional interpretation can be used to interpret the Sheriff’s authority.
First, the Greene and Macon County amendments should be read in pari
materia with the Governor’s authority to ensure the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted so as to uphold the Sheriff’s quasi-legislative grant of authority.164 Next,
general provisions give way to specific provisions in other parts of the constitu-
tion on the same topic.165 The Sheriff’s specific and express constitutional
authority to promulgate rules and regulations, therefore, should supersede the
general authority of the Governor to enforce the laws in this one area. Finally,
even though the court will be careful to interpret provisions of the constitution
in light of strict separation of powers principles, Amendments 743 and 744 are
express delegations of authority and, therefore, are exempt from the non-dele-
gation doctrine.166
Therefore, the Greene and Macon County amendments, under both the
most applicable and general tools of Alabama constitutional construction,
should be upheld as express grants of quasi-legislative authority to the respec-
tive Sheriffs of Greene and Macon Counties. These express delegations of
power should supersede the Governor’s general executive power to ensure the
“laws of faithfully executed.” Consequently, the interpretation of the types of
158 See id.
159 See id. at 605.
160 See S. 9, 1st Spec. Sess., at 585, 594 (Ala. 2003).
161 See H.R. HB660, 1st Sess., at 1335 (Ala. 2003); S. HB660, 1st Sess., at 1054 (Ala.
2003).
162 See Johnny Kampis, Bingo OK’d in Greene, TUSCALOOSANEWS.COM (Nov. 5, 2003, 3:30
AM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20031105/NEWS/311050344?p=All
&tc=PGall (stating after the passage of the amendment that the Sheriff will “be in charge of
determining who gets licenses . . . and where the money will go”); see also Susan Britt,
Macon County Sheriff Accepts Victoryland Bingo Machines as Legal, ALA. POL. REP. (Dec.
13, 2012), http://www.aprthev.com/editorials-2/latest-editorial/3823-2.html.
163 Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 78–79 (Ala. 2009).
164 See House v. Cullman Cnty., 593 So. 2d 69, 72 (Ala. 1992).
165 See Chambers Cnty. Comm’n v. Chambers Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 852 So. 2d 102, 107
(Ala. 2002) (“[A] general provision . . . as a matter of construction, cannot countermand the
express, specific provisions.”).
166 See Chorba-Lee Scholarship Fund Inc. v. Hale, 60 So. 3d 279, 288 (Ala. 2010); see
generally ALA. CONST. amends. 743, 744.
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bingo allowed should fall to the Sheriff until the Supreme Court of Alabama or
the legislature more specifically defines bingo in Alabama.
CONCLUSION
Even after the Supreme Court of Alabama’s most recent bingo decisions, a
lot of uncertainty remains surrounding the legality of electronic bingo. This
seems to stem from the court’s vague definition of the “game commonly known
as bingo” and its constant reluctance to squarely decide the legality of elec-
tronic bingo. As a result, these decisions seem to signal that if the court were to
decide the question, it would have to decide it on other grounds; the most obvi-
ous of which is the language of the amendments themselves, which expressly
grant the Sheriff the quasi-legislative authority to determine by rules and regu-
lations the type of bingo to be played within the county.
Amendments 743 and 744 both by their express language give the Sheriff
the mandatory authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the complete
operation of bingo within the county. This authority has been vested exclu-
sively within “the Sheriff” of the county under Alabama case law. Therefore,
even the Governor’s and Attorney General’s authority to “insure the laws are
faithfully executed,” does not include the power to define the types of bingo to
be played in Macon and Greene Counties. The people of Macon and Greene
Counties stripped the Governor and Attorney General of this general constitu-
tional authority—in this single area—when they decided to place the power to
regulate bingo in the Sheriff of the county through constitutional amendment.
Therefore, through vested quasi-legislative power, the Sheriff has the authority
to determine through rules and regulations the types of bingo allowed within
the county.
